










Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude 
Verbs and Deontic Modals
Friederike Moltmann
On the standard, Fregean view, propositional attitudes are relations between agents 
and propositions, abstract entities that are bearers of truth conditions and act as 
the semantic values of sentences and, in particular, that-clauses. The standard view 
is reflected in what is commonly taken to be the logical form of attitude reports, 
namely what I call the Relational Analysis. On the Relational Analysis, (1a) has the 
logical form in (1b), where the clausal complement that Mary is happy has as its 
semantic value ([Mary is happy]) the proposition that Mary is happy:
(1) a. John thinks that Mary is happy.
b. THINK(John, [Mary is happy])
Propositions are generally conceived as formal objects of some sort, either as 
structured propositions (say n-tuples consisting of an n-place property and n-
1 objects) or sets of possible circumstances. However, such a conception of propo-
sitions faces serious challenges. Most important are two problems: the problem of 
how abstract propositions conceived as formal objects can be grasped and figure 
as the contents of mental states, and the problem of how abstract propositions 
could have truth conditions and the particular truth conditions they are supposed 
to have.1 A number of philosophers have therefore argued that the notion of an 
abstract proposition, conceived as a formal object of one sort or another, should 
be replaced by a cognitive notion of proposition, a mind-dependent object whose 
truth-directedness is tied to the intentionality of an agent. In particular, Soames 
and Hanks have argued that abstract propositions should be replaced by cogni-
tive acts, or rather types of acts (of predicating a property of objects). Such acts 
1 These problems may not arise when propositions are conceived as primitives that would only 
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are to play the role of truth- bearers, and types of such acts are to play the role 
of the meanings of sentences and the contents or objects of propositional atti-
tudes. This view has important predecessors in phenomenology and early analytic 
philosophy.2
Soames and Hanks both adhere to the Relational Analysis of attitude reports, 
and thus take propositional attitudes to be two- place relations between agents and 
types of acts of predication. On their view, (1a) still has the logical form in (1b), 
but the semantic value of the clausal complement [that Mary is happy] will now be 
a type of cognitive act.
This paper argues that what should take the role of truth- bearers associ-
ated with propositional attitudes such as judgment or thought is not cognitive 
acts or types of acts, but the cognitive products of such acts (or types of cognitive 
products). The notion of a cognitive product is to be understood roughly along 
the lines of the distinction between actions and products of Twardowski (1912, 
this volume). This paper is not meant to be exegetical, though, but rather uses 
and further develops a range of ideas of Twardowski without adhering to all of 
Twardowski’s views. Given the notion of a product, it is not an act of judging that 
is a truth- bearer, but a judgment, the product of an act of judging, and it is not 
an act of claiming that has truth conditions, but a claim, the product of an act of 
claiming. The distinction between cognitive or illocutionary acts and their prod-
ucts is little familiar, and Twardowski himself left the action- product distinction 
at an intuitive level, appealing mainly to linguistically reflected intuitions among 
different nominalizations in natural language. Moreover, Twardowski said noth-
ing about the role that products play in the semantics of attitude reports, but just 
focused on the distinction between actions and products as such.
This paper will develop a semantics of attitude reports according to which 
clausal complements of attitude verbs act as predicates of cognitive or illocutionary 
products, or else of mental states; that is, they act as predicates of what I call “atti-
tudinal objects.” This semantics will be carried over to deontic modal sentences, 
which will involve “modal products” rather than attitudinal objects. Formally, the 
semantic analysis will make use of Davidsonian event semantics, so that attitude 
verbs express two- place relations between events (or states) and agents. Acts such 
as acts of thinking and judging will occupy the event argument position, and a 
function prod will map them onto their product, of which the clausal complement 
will then be predicated. Thus, (1a) will have the logical form below:
(1) c. ∃e(THINK(e, John) & [that Mary is happy](prod (e)))
Here prod(e) is the product of the Davidsonian event argument e of think, which 
expresses a relation between acts of thinking and agents.
The analysis in (1c) has a range of novel applications to central issues in 
the philosophy of language and semantics, which will be developed more fully 









Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content256
elsewhere. This paper will focus on the distinction between actions and product 
as such, and on the motivations for making use of products (and mental states) 
instead of propositions for the semantics of attitude reports and deontic modals. 
The paper will further develop Twardowski’s notion of a product, by introducing 
a greater range of characteristics distinguishing actions and products and arguing 
that products have the status of (abstract or physically realized) artifacts produced 
by the actions. Furthermore, the paper will introduce a novel notion of an (endur-
ing) modal product, such as an obligation or permission. Modal products will be 
important for the semantics of deontic modals and promise a new semantics of 
modal sentences in general, a semantics that is based on modal objects rather than 
quantification over possible worlds. Both attitudinal objects and modal products 
generally come with truth or satisfaction conditions. For the semantics of clausal 
complements as predicates of attitudinal and modal objects, the paper will develop 
a version of Fine’s (2012, 2014, forthcoming) recent truthmaker semantics. This 
means that attitudinal objects and modal objects will be associated with situations 
or actions acting as their truthmakers or satisfiers.
There is an alternative to the analysis in (1c) that also goes along with the 
action- product distinction. This is the neo- Russellian Multiple Relations Analysis 
of attitude reports, which I have pursued in previous work, along with the view 
that both actions and products are complex tropes or particularized properties 
(Moltmann 2013a, chap. 4). An appendix to this paper will outline this view and 
give reasons for no longer pursuing it.
1.  The Notion of an Abstract Proposition and Its Recent Critique
In contemporary philosophy of language, propositions are primarily characterized 
in terms of their roles, namely as the sharable objects of propositional attitudes, 
the meanings of sentences (including the shared meaning of equivalent sentences 
from possibly different languages), and the bearers of truth and falsity. In order 
to fulfill these roles, propositions, it appeared, must be abstract and, in particular, 
mind- and language- independent (Frege 1918– 1919). A common move then is to 
identify propositions with formal objects such as sets of circumstances or struc-
tured propositions (say, as sequences consisting of a relation and its arguments). 
Propositions in this sense have recently come under attack by a number of philos-
ophers (Jubien 2001, Moltmann 2003b, 2013a, chap. 4; Soames 2010; Hanks 2007, 
2011, 2015, this volume). One of the problems is how propositions as abstract 
objects can be grasped and figure as contents of mental states. An equally impor-
tant one is the problem of the truth- directedness of the proposition and, related 
to that, the problem of the unity of the proposition. That is, briefly, why should 
a proposition that is identified with a set or a sequence be true or false, and fur-
thermore why should an abstract structured proposition have the particular truth 
conditions it is meant to have? There is nothing inherent in an abstract structured 
object that makes it have (particular) truth conditions; rather, such conditions 
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These problems for abstract propositions have motivated an alternative, act- 
based approach to propositional content. Central to the act- based view is the 
notion of predication as a cognitive act, an act of an agent predicating a prop-
erty or relation of its arguments (Jubien 2001; Moltmann 2003b, 2013a, chap. 4; 
Hanks 2007 2015; Soames 2010, 2015). The act of predication is meant to ensure 
the truth- directedness and particular truth conditions of propositions, which, on 
the act- based view, are identified with types of acts. The act- based approach is 
presented with different options when distinguishing types of acts of predication, 
which go along with different views as regards the logical form of attitude reports:
 [1] There are as many different types of cognitive acts of predication as 
there are different attitudes: predication in the belief way, predication 
in the thinking way, predication in the claiming way, etc. (Jubien 2001; 
Moltmann 2003b, 2004, 2013a, chap. 4). (Formally, the view matches the 
(neo- )Russellian Multiple Relations Analysis discussed in Appendix 2.)
 [2] There is a single type of cognitive act of predication, which corresponds 
to the most general attitude of “entertaining” or “understanding” 
(Soames 2010, 2015). This view maintains a separation of propositional 
content and force, and it goes along with a version of the relational 
Analysis according to which propositional attitudes are relations between 
agents and types of acts of predication in the entertaining way.
 [3] There are different types of acts of predication of more general sorts, 
which match declarative, imperative, and interrogative sentences (Hanks 
2007, 2011). This view considers propositional content to be inseparable 
from force and goes along with a version of the Relational Analysis 
according to which propositional attitudes are relations between agents 
and types of acts of predication of one of the three sorts.
My critique of the act- based approach will focus on [2] and [3], though it may also 
apply to a version of [1] (but see Appendix 2).
2.  The Distinction between Actions and Products
2.1.  CHARACTERISTICS DISTINGUISHING ACTIONS AND PRODUCTS
There is a serious problem for the act- based approach in general, and that is that 
actions or action types are simply not suited to play the role of propositions, 
namely as truth- bearers and the shared contents of attitudes. An act or act type is 
not something that is intuitively true or false, and it lacks a range of further prop-
erties that entities should have to be able to play the role of propositions (as will 
be elaborated shortly). There is a different sort of cognitive entity, though, suited 
to play that role, namely entities of the sort of “judgments,” “thoughts,” “beliefs,” 
and “claims.” These are cognitive and illocutionary products. Cognitive and illo-
cutionary products fall under the more general category of “attitudinal objects,” 
which also include mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and expectations (see 









Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content258
are, by nature, entities that can be true or false; acts of judging and claiming are 
not. Judgments and claims are not abstract propositions, though; rather, they are 
cognitive particulars, but in the sense of products of cognitive acts, not the acts 
themselves.
The distinction between cognitive or illocutionary acts and the corresponding 
cognitive and illocutionary products or attitudinal objects goes back to Twardowski 
(1909, 1912).3 Twardowski drew a very general distinction between actions and 
products, which includes not only the familiar distinction between an action and 
its enduring physical product, such as an act of writing and the writing (the writ-
ten work), an act of drawing and the drawing, and an act of folding and the fold.4 
Twardowski’s distinction also comprises a less familiar distinction between a men-
tal act and its non- enduring mental product, such as an act of judging and a judg-
ment, an act of thinking and a thought, and an act of deciding and a decision.5 
Furthermore, it includes the distinction between an illocutionary act and its (psy-
chophysical) illocutionary product, such as the distinction between act of claiming 
and a claim, an act of requesting and a request, and an act of asking and a question.
Entities such as judgments, thoughts, beliefs, desires, claims, and requests, 
according to Twardowski, are non- enduring products that exist only as long 
as there is the corresponding mental or illocutionary event or state.6 However, 
judgments, thoughts, desires, claims, and requests can be “reproduced” by per-
forming actions with similar products. The relation of similarity among prod-
ucts is central to the notion of a product and its proposition- like role, though 
Twardowski himself did not further elaborate it (and no in- depth attempt will 
be made in this paper either). The idea, roughly, is if two products are similar, 
then they are the same in content. That is, similarity among products is prior 
to a notion of content. The similarity relation among products allows for the 
“stabilization” of what appears to be an enduring propositional content, which 
emerges from the production of actions with similar products.7 For Twardowski, 
it is thus products, not actions, that approximate the notion of a propositional 
content. The notion of a product permitted him to overcome the objections in 
psychologism to an act- based conception of propositional content at the time 
(Twardowski, 1909). Thus, it is products, not actions, that were to play the role of 
3 The distinction had been recognized already by Bolzano, actually (see the introduction to this 
volume). It also plays a central role also in the work of Ingarden (1931), a student of Twardowski’s. For 
a presentation of Twardowski’s view in its historical context, see Bobryk (2009), Betti (2016), Dubucs 
and Miskiewicz (2009), Miskiewicz (this volume), and van der Schaar (2006).
4 See Twardowski (1912, §34) for a more detailed discussion.
5 Twardowksi’s (1912) examples actually include also states and their “products,” such as a believ-
ing and a belief, an expecting and an expectation, and a hoping and a hope. But see Section 2.3. for a 
discussion as to whether there should be a distinction between states and products.
6 Twardowski’s view that non- enduring products last just as long as the corresponding action does 
not seem quite correct. For an action that is an accomplishment, say an act of asserting, the product 
(the assertion) is more likely to come into existence only at the end of the action.
7 Also, the understanding of a product consists in the production of a similar product. In addi-
tion, the product that is to be understood needs to cause the product of the act of understanding 
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meanings of sentences permitting logical inferences (so at least in Twardowski 
1909).8
Like cognitive acts, cognitive products are mind- dependent entities and thus 
do not give rise to the problems of abstract propositions, namely how propositions 
could be grasped and have truth conditions. Truth and representation are tied to 
the intentionality of agents, and thus to their cognitive products— however such a 
tie is ultimately to be understood.
Products differ from actions in the sorts of properties they can have.9 Two 
distinguishing characteristics of actions and products, the ability to bear truth or 
satisfaction conditions and the way of entering similarity relations, are mentioned 
by Twardowski himself and play a central role in his view— and for the distinction 
as such.
First, cognitive products have truth conditions or, more generally, satisfaction 
conditions, unlike actions. Cognitive products such as judgments can intuitively 
be true or false, but not so for cognitive acts such as acts of judging. Similarly, 
illocutionary acts such as speech acts of claiming can hardly be said to be true or 
false; rather, it is the claim, the product of the speech act, that is a bearer of truth 
or falsity.
Aune (1967) notes that the adverbial truly appears to predicate truth of the 
described action, which would contradict the generalization just stated:
(2) a. John truly believes that he won the lottery.
b. John truly asserted that Mary is French.
However, English truly is exceptional in conveying truth when applied to events, 
as a quick look at other languages indicates. German, French, and Italian, for 
example, do not have adverbial counterparts of wahr, vrai, or vero that act in the 
way English truly acts. The adverbial counterparts wahrlich, vraiment, and vera-
mente mean “really” rather than “truly”, in the German, French, and Italian trans-
lations of (2b) below:
(3) a. Hans hat wahrlich behauptet, dass Maria Französin ist.
b. Jean a vraiment dit que Marie est Française.
c. Gianni a veramente detto que Maria é francese.
8 Twardowksi (1912, §44) actually envisages the meaning of sentences in logical inferences to be 
“artifacts” in a different sense than I use the notion in this paper. See Betti (2006).
9 Twardowski (1912) mentions a range of predicates that distinguish between actions and prod-
ucts, but he does not give a systematic characterization of the distinction in terms of the types of prop-
erties that actions and products have. Twardowski (1912, §22) mentions define as a predicate applying 
to concepts but not the activity of conceiving, unintelligible as applying to questions but not the act of 
posing of a question, unsolvable as applying to problems but not to the act of posing a problem, overlook 
as applying to errors but not acts of erring, unfulfilled as applying to expectations but not the action of 
expecting, implement as applying to resolutions but not acts of resolving to do something, and inspiring 
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True is infelicitous also as a noun modifier applying to actions. John’s true act of 
claiming is just as unacceptable as John’s act of claiming is true, in English as in 
other languages. This means that truly as an adverbial has a derivative meaning, 
sharing its meaning with accurately. Accurate is the adjective that specifically con-
veys adequacy of the representational content associated with an action (as well 
as a product). While the data about English, German, French, and Italian call for 
a more thorough linguistic study of adverbial formation and its semantics, they 
clearly show that no philosophical conclusion should be drawn from the particu-
lar way truly works in English.
Other products may not have truth conditions, but rather satisfaction con-
ditions, of various sorts, reflected in the applicability of a different predicates of 
satisfaction and violation (that is, failure to satisfy). For example, a decision may 
be implemented, but not an act of deciding. There is a great range of illocutionary 
acts and products that differ in that way, an observation made independently of 
Twardowski by Ulrich (1976) (who, though, does not use the notion of a prod-
uct). A demand may be fulfilled or complied with, but not an act of demanding. 
A promise may be broken, but not an act of promising. A request may be followed 
or ignored, but not an act of requesting— at least not in the relevant sense of “follow-
ing” or “ignoring.” A command may be executed, but not an act of commanding.
Predicates expressing the satisfaction (or violation) of illocutionary prod-
ucts make it particularly clear that products can be neither acts nor propositions 
(Ulrich 1976). Propositions are not things that could (in the relevant sense) be 
fulfilled, implemented, complied with, broken, followed, ignored, or executed. 
Illocutionary products must be entities of a third kind, distinct from both propo-
sitions and events. This also holds for cognitive products. Decisions can be imple-
mented, but hardly so for acts of deciding.
Truth- directed cognitive and illocutionary products differ from acts (and 
propositions) also in that they are associated with a particular correctness condi-
tion (Moltmann 2015a). A belief— this is how the notion in fact applies— is correct 
just in case it is true. Similarly, a claim is correct just in case it is true. The claim 
differs in that respect from the speech act: an act of claiming is correct just in case 
it fulfills whatever the contextually given norm, which may not include that of the 
truth of what is claimed. With truth- directed products, the fulfillment of the norm 
associated with the product consists in the truth of the product itself, but not so 
for the corresponding action.10
Truth or satisfaction conditions do not pertain to all products. Some products 
may lack truth or satisfaction conditions, such as expressive cognitive and illo-
cutionary products (amazements, appreciations, certain sorts of imaginations).
10 The adverbial correctly behaves like truly in English, conveying truth rather than the correct-
ness of acts:
(i) John correctly said/ believed that S.
Again this is not so for the corresponding adverbials in other languages. Thus, the corresponding 
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A second important characteristic distinguishing actions and products is 
that products enter similarity relations strictly on the basis being the same in 
content. That is, for two products of the same sort (for example, two thoughts or 
two claims) to be exactly similar means for them to be the same in content.11 By 
contrast, for two actions to be exactly similar, they need to fulfill other condi-
tions, such as having been performed in the very same way. John’s thought “is 
the same as” (that is, is exactly similar to) Mary’s thought just in case the con-
tent of John’s thought is identical to the content of Mary’s thought. By contrast, 
for John’s activity of thinking to “be the same as” Mary’s, this condition is not 
generally sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary); rather, other conditions 
need to be fulfilled. For actions, the manner in which they are performed is 
essential for their identity, but for products the manner in which they are pro-
duced is not.12
The applicability of the is of identity also shows the involvement of force in 
cognitive and illocutionary products:  exact similarity requires the same force. 
Thus, John’s claim that Mary should leave cannot be “the same as” his request that 
Mary should leave, and John’s desire to leave cannot be “the same as” his decision 
to leave. The involvement of force is also responsible for why cognitive and illocu-
tionary products differ in what type of satisfaction or correctness conditions they 
are associated with.
Actions and products differ also in properties of understanding. An utterance 
may be incomprehensible, but not the act of uttering. Understanding an answer is 
quite different from understanding the act of answering. Only the former relates to 
the content of the answer, not the latter. Furthermore, actions and products differ 
in their causal relations. If an illocutionary product has a causal effect, then the 
content will play a causal role, whereas content won’t bear on the causal effect of 
an action. Thus, if John’s speech delighted Mary, it is the content of the speech that 
has the emotional effect, but not so if John’s speaking delighted Mary. Similarly, 
11 A “shared content” will of course mean a common feature of attitudinal objects, not an entity 
that attitudinal objects stand in a relation to. Propositional content is to be considered a feature of 
products, not an object products relate to.
12 Relations of exact similarity are reflected in the applicability of is the same as in English, which 
expresses qualitative, not numerical identity:
(i) a. John’s thought is the same as Mary’s thought.
b. John’s thinking is the same as Mary’s thinking.
(ia) is true just in case John has a thought with the same content as Mary, but not so for (ib). By 
contrast, the is of identity, which does express numerical identity, seems false of distinct attitudinal 
objects, at least under normal circumstances (let’s say in which John’s and Mary’s thoughts were not 
coordinated):
(ii) ?? John’s thought is Mary’s thought.
Note that the predicate is identical to is better in that context, which indicates that it expresses 
qualitative, not numerical, identity:
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for an answer to cause surprise, it is the content that triggered the surprise, but not 
so for an act of answering that caused surprise.13 Related to properties of under-
standing and content- based causation are properties of content- based evaluation. 
When attitudinal objects are evaluated, they are evaluated with respect to both 
their content and their force, but not so for actions. A  thought being interest-
ing is something quite different from the act of thinking being interesting. It is 
also something different from an abstract proposition being interesting. Similarly, 
John’s thought process may be unusual, without his thought or the corresponding 
abstract proposition being unusual.
Another important difference between actions and products concerns part- 
whole relations (a difference not recognized by Twardowski). The part structures 
of cognitive and illocutionary products strictly involve content- related parts rather 
than temporal or material parts. That is, part structures of cognitive and illocu-
tionary products are driven by partial content. Thus, a part of a thought, a belief, 
or a decision is not a temporal part, but a partial content. By contrast, the part 
structure of actions generally consists of temporal parts and not content- related 
parts. Thus, the parts of products are distinct from the parts of the corresponding 
actions. Part of John’s decision cannot be part of the action of deciding. Part of 
John’s claim cannot be part of the speech act. Part of John’s answer cannot be part 
of John’s answering.
Actions and products appear to also differ in their relation to time. 
Philosophical views about events and actions generally take them to have their 
time of occurrence essentially (most obviously when events are identified with 
space- time regions or property instantiations in times). But there is a strong 
intuition that the time of creation is not essential for (non- enduring) products. 
Non- enduring products such as thoughts, screams, or decisions may be spatio-
temporally coincident with the action that produces them; however, a thought or 
scream might have occurred earlier than it did, and a decision could have been 
made later than it was.
2.2.  COGNITIVE PRODUCTS AND ABSTRACT ARTIFACTS
The relation between a cognitive act and its cognitive product may seem hard 
to grasp, given that cognitive acts and their products may be spatiotemporally 
coincident, and that the distinction appears so closely tied to nominalizations 
in particular languages. Twardowski’s (1912) article itself is focused on the lin-
guistic properties of two sorts of nominalizations in Polish (in the first version of 
the paper), German (in the second version), and French (in an incomplete third 
version).14 Clearly, though, Twardowski took the distinction to be a fundamental 
13 Note that propositional content alone (what would be an abstract proposition) cannot be caus-
ally efficacious, but only in connection with an attitudinal or illocutionary force and an agent— that is, 
as part of a cognitive product.
14 The German version, “Funktionen und Gebilde,” and the French version, “Actions et Produits,” 
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philosophical one, not just one reflecting the semantics of particular types of 
nouns found in Polish, German, and French.15
In fact, the same sort of distinction is very compelling in many cases not 
directly tied to types of terms in a particular language. The distinction between 
cognitive or illocutionary acts and their products can be considered part of the 
more general relation between an act and the abstract or physically realized arti-
fact that it creates— a view, though, that Twardowski himself did not articulate.16 
Artifacts may be “abstract” artifacts in the sense of Thomasson (1999), that is, arti-
facts that lack a material realization. Yet as artifacts they are created at a particular 
time and may go out of existence.
What is particular about artifacts in general is that they need not be tied to 
a particular physical realization. Artifacts may lack a physical realization entirely, 
such as electronic files and unwritten rules, as well as cognitive products such as 
thoughts, judgments, beliefs, and desires. Other artifacts, such as poems and musi-
cal compositions, may or may not come with a physical realization (as products of 
writing, reciting, or performing).17 Even illocutionary acts may come with endur-
ing materially realized products. Thus, a particular piece of writing is an enduring 
product of what may be a particular illocutionary act manifested by writing, not 
speech. Yet other artifacts may have multiple physical realizations, such as bronze 
statues and books.
Another particularity of artifacts— abstract artifacts like physically realized 
ones— is that they are mind- dependent. They depend for their identity on an agent 
and his or her intentions (Ingarden 1931; Thomasson 2004, 2005).
and Gedanke ‘thought’, Urteilen ‘judging’ and Urteil ‘judgment’, Entscheiden ‘deciding’ and Entscheidung 
‘decision’; in French the corresponding contrast is between penser and pensée, juger and jugement, 
décider and décision. The English translation reflects the distinction equally well.
15 Twardowski’s intuitive description of the distinction actually focuses on different aspects of 
entities. Thus, Twardowski characterizes nouns describing products as nouns “that do not bring to 
force the aspect of action, but bring to force a different aspect, the ‘phenomenal’ or ‘static’ aspect” 
(Twardowski 1912, §2). Similarly, in the particular case of a shout, as opposed to a shouting, he says 
“in speaking of the shout, we do in fact abstract from the activity of shouting, treating the shout as 
an acoustic phenomenon” (Twardowski 1912, §3). Twardowski (1912, §§4 and 9) appears to recog-
nize a gradual transition from a distinction that differentiates between aspects of one and the same 
entity (as with certain physical action— product pairs) to a full- fledged ontological distinction both 
between mental actions and their products and, most obviously, certain psychophysical actions and 
their products (drawing and the drawing, etc). See also Brandl (1998) for a non- ontological view of 
the distinction.
16 Twardowski actually uses the notion “artifact” in a very different way, meaning a subset of prod-
ucts, such as the products of “presenting a judgment,” which, according to Twardowski (1912, §44) may 
serve as the meanings of sentences in logical inferences. See Betti (2006) and footnote 8.
17 The difference between, on the one hand, thoughts, judgments, and desires, which cannot have 
a physical realization, and, on the other hand, poems and musical compositions is reflected in the 
applicability of predicates like write to the latter, but not to the former:
(i) a. John wrote a poem/ a song.
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The characteristics distinguishing cognitive and illocutionary products from 
the corresponding actions can be found in essentially the same way with other 
abstract artifacts not tied directly to particular types of terms of natural language 
(product nominalizations), such as laws and rules or works of art of the relevant 
sort. Moreover, they can, to an extent, also be found with materially realized 
artifacts.
First of all, artifacts, whether or not they have a physical realization, may carry 
representational properties, but not so for the acts of creating them. Moreover, 
artifacts may bear satisfaction conditions and thus carry normative force, but not 
so for the actions of creating or setting up those artifacts. Laws or rules can be 
followed or violated and thus have normative force, but not so for the actions of 
establishing them. Artifacts with representational or normative properties also 
share the content- related types of properties that cognitive and illocutionary prod-
ucts display, such as properties of understanding and content- based causation and 
evaluation. Works of art and not the acts of their creation are meant to be the 
objects of aesthetic evaluation, and clearly works of art may have a range of aes-
thetic properties that the acts of creating hardly need to share.
Moreover, artifacts may have a part structure based on partial content rather 
than material parts, as is obvious from the understanding of part of in part of the 
law and part of the novel. Representational artifacts that have a material realiza-
tion, such as books and letters, typically have two distinct part structures, one 
based on partial content and one based on material (spatial) parts. Thus, a book 
(token) as a materially realized artifact has two part structures at once, allowing 
for two readings of part of. Part of in describing a part of the book may stand either 
for a part of the information object (partial content) or for a physical part of the 
material object.18
Cognitive and illocutionary products also share with works of art their depen-
dency on an agent. Works of art, whether abstract or physically realized, depend 
on their creator for their identity— at least on a common view.19 Two artists could 
not, by accident, compose one and the same poem. Rather, even if the poems com-
posed by the poets are the same in content, they are distinct works of art.
Recognizing that cognitive and illocutionary products fall under the more 
general category of (abstract or physically realized) artifacts, which are an indis-
putable part of common sense ontology, makes cognitive and illocutionary prod-
ucts much easier to accept. At the same time, it must be added that the category 
of artifacts is far from uncontroversial, and that there is not much of a fully devel-
oped ontological theory of artifacts. Still, artifacts themselves are well character-
ized by common characteristics not shared by any other category of objects.
18 For some reason, illocutionary products, with an auditory physical realization, do not display 
two types of part structure, but only the content- related one. Part of the claim, part of the demand, and 
part of the answer can never refer to part of the speech act.
19 The view had been defended by Fine (1982) and Thomasson (1999) for fictional characters. But 
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2.3.  PRODUCTS AND MENTAL STATES
Entities such as intentions, beliefs, and desires share the general characteristics 
of cognitive products. First, they have truth or satisfaction conditions: an inten-
tion can be realized, a belief can be true, a desire can be fulfilled. Moreover, they 
appear to enter similarity relations on the basis of being the same in content. John’s 
intention is the same as Mary’s, John’s belief is the same as Mary’s, John’s desire 
is the same as Mary’s just in case they share their content, that is, their satisfac-
tion conditions. Furthermore, entities such as intentions, beliefs, and desires have 
a part structure based on partial content. Part of John’s intention, part of John’s 
belief, and part of John’s desire can only be a partial content, not a temporal part 
of a state. Finally, intentions, beliefs, and desires appear to be able to enter causal 
relations, based on content. Mary’s belief, intention, or desire may cause her to act 
a certain way or to form other beliefs, intentions, or desires.
However, beliefs, intentions, and desires are not obviously products of acts, 
and certainly the terms used to refer to them are not derived from verbs describing 
cognitive acts; rather, they are derived from stative verbs (believe, intend, desire). 
Still, one might try to assimilate the objects in question to artifacts, though not 
derived from the state described by the corresponding verbs. There are various 
conceptions of belief that have been offered by philosophers of mind that could 
make beliefs, say, come out as artifacts.20 On one conception of belief, beliefs are 
mental representations with representational character, such as sentences in a lan-
guage of thought. On that conception, beliefs are enduring products, presumably 
set up by an act of judging and placed in a “belief box,” as enduring mental arti-
facts. On a functional variant of that conception, beliefs as mental representations 
are functionally individuated, in terms of their causal roles regarding the external 
environment. A notion of artifact is applicable to that conception as well. There 
are functionally individuated artifacts, such as a piece of wood that gains the sta-
tus of an artifact by being habitually used as a table. On another, dispositionalist 
conception of belief, beliefs would be based on judgments (or other mental acts) 
produced regularly over time. Again, such a conception could be subsumed under 
the notion of an artifact, since artifacts include unwritten rules or habits that, like 
other artifacts, may carry normative properties. Finally, there is the interpretation-
alist conception of belief, according to which beliefs result from an interpretation 
of behavior of the agent (Dennett’s 1987 intentional stance). Beliefs on this con-
ception are what can be called recognitional products, products that do not result 
from the creation of a new object but from the recognition of an entity in a given 
situation. Recognitional artifacts can be found in other areas of social ontology. 
Certain works of art are recognitional artifacts, such as Chinese scholar rocks. 
Chinese scholar rocks, in the best tradition, do not involve any material interfer-
ence on the part of the artist, but only recognition of a stone as an object of art on 
the basis of its natural aesthetic properties.
20 Here I  will follow E.  Schwitzgebel; see his entry “Belief,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
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Note that on these views, intentions, beliefs, and desires do not come out as 
products of an event described by the verbs intend, believe, and desire and thus 
the views would not specifically support a unified view of the semantics of attitude 
reports.
Not on everyone’s conception can beliefs, intentions, and desires be viewed as 
products in any of the ways described above. Thus, on Searle’s (1983) view, inten-
tions are states that are prior to intentional acts, with the intentionality of states not 
being derivative upon the intentionality of acts. Certainly, the semantics of attitude 
reports should not be committed to a particular view in the philosophy of mind 
about mental states, and they should at least be compatible with influential views 
about them.
In the semantics of attitude reports with mental state verbs, therefore, the 
product function prod applies to mental states mapping them onto themselves.21
2.4.  PRODUCTS, TRUTHMAKING, AND SATISFACTION
I will adopt the view that cognitive and illocutionary products such as judgments, 
beliefs, and claims have not only truth conditions, but also truthmakers, entities 
(actual or possible situations situations) in virtue of which truth- bearers are true. 
Truthmaking here is to be understood in the sense of Fine (2012, 2014, forthcom-
ing). Fine has pursued a truthmaker- based semantics in the interest of conceiving of 
a notion of content as an alternative to that based on possible worlds. Truthmaking, 
for Fine, is the relation of exact truthmaking, a relation which holds between an 
actual or possible situation (or state) and a truth- bearer (a proposition or sentence) 
just in case the truthmaker is wholly relevant for the truth of the truth- bearer. For 
the present purposes, truthmaking will also obtain between a truthmaker and a 
cognitive or illocutionary product, or more generally an attitudinal object.
The truthmaking relation naturally extends to the relation of satisfaction. 
Products such as decisions, plans demands, promises, and offers do not have situ-
ations as truthmakers; rather, they have actions or situations as satisfiers, which 
play an analogous role to that of truthmakers.22 A satisfier thus is an entity (an 
actual or possible action or situation) in virtue of which an attitudinal object is sat-
isfied, or that is wholly relevant for the satisfaction of an attitudinal object. While 
there may not be an immediate reflection in natural language of the truthmaking 
21 It should be mentioned that stative attitude verbs display two sorts of nominalizations seem-
ingly displaying the action- product distinction. A ‘desire’ may be satisfied or not, but hardly a ‘desiring’ 
(or a state of desiring). An ‘expectation’ or ‘hope’ may be fulfilled, but hardly a ‘state’ of expecting or 
hoping. The gerund arguably refers to a different notion of a state than the “product” nominalization 
(perhaps a state of a property holding of an object, an abstraction from a property and an object. See 
Moltmann 2013b for such a notion of an abstract state).
22 This is also Fine’s (forthcoming) view, though Fine takes satisfaction to be a relation between 
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relation involving attitudinal objects, the satisfaction relation is reflected in the 
by- locution:
(4) John fulfilled Mary’s request by coming to the party.
Not only may situations and actions act as truthmakers or satisfiers of prod-
ucts, but also cognitive or illocutionary products themselves. Certain types 
of products characteristically require cognitive or illocutionary products as 
satisfiers. In particular, questions require as satisfiers answers, which them-
selves are either illocutionary or cognitive products. Questions themselves are 
either illocutionary products, the products of asking, or cognitive products, 
the products of inquiry. As illocutionary products (of askings), questions are 
satisfied by illocutionary products of assertions. As cognitive products (of 
wonderings), questions may be satisfied by cognitive products that are pieces 
of knowledge.
Satisfaction relations and kinds of satisfiers can thus play an important role 
in characterizing different types of cognitive or illocutionary products, as well as 
mental states.
2.5.  MODAL PRODUCTS
Cognitive and illocutionary products generally do not endure past the action that 
produced them. However, actions that set up products with a normative force 
may lead at the same time to enduring normative products. A law, for example, 
that is established by an act of declaring or passing it will endure beyond the act 
itself.
A range of illocutionary acts may lead to enduring normative (modal) prod-
ucts. An act of promising will not just produce a promise, but also an enduring 
commitment on the part of the agent making the promise. The commitment itself 
is also a product of the act of promising because it comes into existence by the 
act of promising and it has satisfaction conditions, which only products can have. 
In fact, the commitment has the same satisfaction conditions as the promise that 
it goes along with, and it shares the same satisfiers with the latter. Also, an act of 
permitting may set up an enduring modal product, namely the permission that the 
addressee may have for a longer period of time. Similarly, an act of offering creates 
an enduring product: the offer that may obtain for a period of time beyond the 
duration of the act. Finally, an act of commanding may produce a lasting obliga-
tion on the part of the addressee.
Modal products share relevant properties with cognitive and illocutionary 
products, such as satisfaction conditions, similarity based on shared satisfaction 
conditions, and properties of concreteness (coming into existence and going out 
of existence at a particular time, entering causal relations).
Normative products such as laws, commitments, obligations, permissions, 
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action that set them up. They do not require subsequent sustaining actions ensur-
ing their persistence, but only the initial act establishing them.
Enduring normative products are clearly part of our social ontology in gen-
eral, and they are well reflected in natural language, namely in the semantic behav-
ior of nominalizations of the sort commitment, obligation, permission, and offer 
and the existence predicates that go along with them, such as obtain and have. An 
obligation that results from a demand may “obtain” at a time way past the time of 
the action, and an agent may “have” the obligation for a long time. Similarly, an 
offer may “hold” or “be valid” for a long time past the act of making it, just as a law 
may “hold” or “be valid” past the act of establishing it.
The endurance of modal products is linguistically reflected in the choice of tense 
in specificational sentences. If John demanded yesterday that Bill leave the country 
next week, then past tense rather than present tense is required in (5a), but not in (5b):
(5) a. John’s demand was / ??? is that Bill leave the country next week.
b. Bill’s obligation is to leave the country next week.
Illocutionary products require the tense of the copula to reflect the time of the act, 
whereas with modal products the copula needs to reflect the time of the validity of 
the norm constitutive of the modal product.
2.6.  THE PRIORITY OF ACTIONS OVER PRODUCTS?
The distinction between actions and products raises the question of what takes 
priority, the action or the product? Clearly, the product depends for its existence 
on the act, and not vice versa. However, there is also a dependence of the act on 
the product. While the intentional act may be performed by performing physi-
cal acts, the identity of the intentional act may also depend on what is intended, 
the product. Moreover, the act may inherit certain properties from the product. 
This is reflected in part linguistically, in the application of adverbial modifiers. 
John painted beautifully means that John produces beautiful paintings, not that 
the activity of painting as such is beautiful. John writes well may mean that the 
product, John’s written work, is good, not that the act of writing as such is. The act 
may depend for its identity on the product; the product certainly depends for its 
existence on the act.
There is also a linguistic side to the question of the priority of actions 
as opposed to products. Attitudinal objects are generally (but not always) 
referred to by nominalizations of verbs, whereas actions are described by verbs 
and act as their implicit arguments, given Davidsonian event semantics. This 
suggests an equally derivative ontological status of products over actions. It 
is not obvious, however, that the linguistic facts support such a generaliza-
tion. Both products and action nominalizations are found across languages 
(Gerner, this volume). Moreover, many languages, instead of using a simple 
attitude verb, use complex predicates consisting of a light verb (such as have, 
make, give) and a product NP, of the sort have a need, make a promise, or give 
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3.  The Role of Attitudinal Objects in the Semantics of Sentences
3.1.  PRODUCTS AND THE UNDERSPECIFICATION OF ATTITUDE REPORTS
Twardowski himself said nothing about how the semantics of attitude reports is 
to be understood on the basis of the action- product distinction.23 I will outline 
an account of that role of attitudinal objects in the semantics of attitude reports 
that is based on considerations that are independent of Twardowski’s own views 
and have motivations beyond the action- product distinction as such.
Cognitive products are not the objects of propositional attitudes (or their con-
tents), but rather, just as the term says, their products. If cognitive products are to 
replace propositions (for attitudes such as judgment or thought), it will no longer 
make sense to view such propositional attitudes as relations between agents and 
proposition- like truth- bearers, which will be reflected in a different semantics of 
attitude reports. I  will take sentences to act not as terms standing for types of 
attitudinal objects, but rather as predicates of attitudinal and modal objects. One 
important reason for this is that complement clauses may underspecify the attitu-
dinal object, with respect to its satisfaction conditions as well as in other respects. 
One case of such underspecification has recently been discussed by Graff Fara 
(2013), namely desire reports in which the clausal complement underspecifies the 
satisfaction conditions of the reported desire. Her examples are given below:
(6) a. Fiona wants to catch a fish.
b. Charlotte wants to have some champagne.
The desire described by (6a) is not just satisfied in case Fiona catches a fish. It is 
satisfied only when she catches a fish suitable for eating, let’s say. Similarly, the 
desire in (6b) won’t be satisfied if Charlotte drinks an amount of champagne that 
makes her dizzy, or if she drinks bad champagne that gives her a headache. If a 
desire report reports the conditions under which the desire is satisfied, then the 
complement clause in such a report may underspecify those conditions, giving 
only a partial characterization of them.
Treating clausal complements as predicates of cognitive products gives a 
straightforward account of the underspecification problem of desire reports. The 
clausal complement of the desire verb may give only necessary, not sufficient, con-
ditions on the satisfaction of the reported desire. This is captured by the meaning 
of a sentence S as the property of attitudinal objects below, where ╟ is the relation 
of exact truthmaking and ╠ is the relation of inexact truthmaking:
(7) [S]  = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → s ╠ S)]
23 Twardowski (1912, §44) does say something about the role of products in independent sen-
tences, though. He takes products (judgments) to be the meanings of declarative sentences, but also 
recognizes that not all sentences, in particular those that have not been uttered, can stand for prod-
ucts. Instead, sentences may represent products that fail to exist, just as representations in general may 
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The relation ╟ comprises different satisfaction relations reflected in the use of dif-
ferent satisfaction predicates in natural language that are applicable to attitudinal 
objects. They include the truthmaking, fulfillment, acceptance, and compliance 
relation. In particular, the relation ╟ covers both world- to- word/ mind directions 
of fit as well as word/ mind- to- world direction of fit. For independent sentences, 
these correspond to two different sentence types of declaratives and imperatives. 
(In addition, there is the interrogative sentence type, which corresponds to illocu-
tionary products whose satisfiers are answers; that is, assertions of a sort.) 
(7) also accounts for the possibility of attitudinal objects imposing particular 
conditions on the kinds of satisfiers they may have. Thus, Searle (1983) argued 
that intentions and requests take not just actions as satisfiers, but also actions “by 
way of fulfilling” the intention or request. Assuming that an “action by way of 
fulfilling an intention” is ontologically distinct from the action itself, it would only 
be actions by way of fulfilling an intention d that stand in the relation ╟ to d, not 
actions as such.
Of course, a clausal complement of an attitude verb may give a partial charac-
terization of the attitudinal objects not only in terms of its satisfaction conditions, 
but also, for example, in terms of its composition, its physical realization, or its 
emotive components, and depending on the attitude in question as well as the 
context.24
3.2.  ATTITUDINAL OBJECTS AND THE SEMANTICS OF ATTITUDE REPORTS
Let us now turn to the details of the formal semantics of attitude reports on which 
clausal complements act as predicates of attitudinal objects rather than standing 
for propositions.
Unlike propositions, attitudinal objects do not play the role of the objects of 
attitudes; that is, propositional attitudes are not attitudes toward attitudinal objects. 
An attitudinal object matches the content of an attitude report as a whole and not 
just that of the clausal complement of the attitude verb. The clausal complements 
serve to merely characterize the attitudinal object. This role of attitudinal objects 
can best be accounted for within Davidsonian event semantics.
Given Davidsonian event semantics, verbs have an additional argument posi-
tion for events. The implicit event arguments are meant to be the entities that 
adverbial modifiers apply to. Applying Davidsonian event semantics to attitude 
verbs, this means that attitude verbs take implicit arguments that are mental acts 
or states or illocutionary acts. The implicit arguments of attitude verbs should 
be products rather than actions, since they should be the very same entities that 
24 In this paper, I will restrict myself to giving a formulation of the meaning of sentences in terms 
of satisfaction conditions. But the complement clause may also specify the structure or internal com-
position of an illocutionary or cognitive product, such as a product of saying or thinking, as consist-
ing, say, of referential products, predicational products, or concept- conveying products. There may be 
a contextual flexibility as to how the complement clause characterizes the illocutionary or cognitive 
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gerunds stand for, and in fact adverbial modifiers generally are understood as 
predicates of actions rather than products.25 For example, slow is a predicate that 
applies well to actions, but not so well to products (John’s slow thinking,??? John’s 
slow thought), and it is unproblematic as an adverbial applying to verbs describing 
mental acts (John thought slowly).
For verbs describing a mental or illocutionary act e, there will then be a prod-
uct associated with e of which the clausal complement will be predicated.26 The 
report of an occurrent thought, as possibly in (8a), will then have the logical form 
in (8b):
(8) a. John thinks that Mary is happy.
b. ∃e(think(John, e) & [that Mary is happy](prod(e)))
Mental states such as beliefs, intentions, and expectations are not acts, and thus 
have no products. Here the clausal complement is instead predicated of the mental 
states themselves. Formally, the report of a mental state, as in (9a), will have the 
very same logical form:
(9) a. John believes that Mary is happy.
b. ∃e(believe(e, John) & [that Mary is happy](prod(e)))
However, the product function now maps the mental state onto itself; that is, in 
this case, prod(e) = e.
More generally, the compositional semantics of the construction attitude 
verb- clausal complement will be as follows:
(10) For an attitude verb V and clausal complement S, [V S] = λx[∃e(V(e, x) 
& [S] (prod(e)))].
Note that predication of the clausal complement of the product of the Davidsonian 
event argument differs from the way adverbial modifiers are predicated, namely 
as predicates of the Davidsonian event argument. Clausal complements are not 
adverbial modifiers, and moreover they are not referential arguments. Rather, they 
enter a special syntactic relation of clausal complementation to the verb, a relation 
whose interpretation consists in predicating the clausal complement of the prod-
uct of the Davidsonian argument of the verb.
This semantics of clausal complements applies well when sentences are 
embedded under attitude verbs. It is less obvious how it applies to sentences 
embedded under non- attitudinal predicates. This is not the place for an 
25 But see the exceptional behavior of English truly and correctly, mentioned earlier.
26 Whether an act has a unique product is a serious issue. In the present context, simplifying, I will 
assume so. Otherwise, the semantics of attitude reports will have to have to involve a function from acts 
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exhaustive treatment of the various cases, though. It should suffice to just men-
tion two ways in which the semantics of attitude verbs with clausal comple-
ments carries over to non- attitudinal predicates. First, a sentence embedded 
under a non- attitudinal predicate may act as a predicate of a contextually given 
illocutionary product, such as a claim made in the discourse context, as I have 
argued in regard to truth predicates such as true and correct (Moltmann 2015b). 
Second, non- attitudinal predicates may be associated with modal objects rather 
than attitudinal objects, and their clausal complements will then be predicated 
of those. In particular, deontic modals, as we will see, are associated with modal 
products (Section 5.1).
3.3.  LINGUISTIC SUPPORT FOR CLAUSAL COMPLEMENTS AS PREDICATES 
OF ATTITUDINAL AND MODAL OBJECTS
In addition to the general philosophical considerations in support of clausal com-
plements as predicates of the relevant attitudinal object, there is specific linguistic 
support for it, namely [1] the Substitution problem, [2] a systematic alternation 
across between simple attitude verbs and complex attitudinal predicates, and [3] 
the semantic behavior of special quantifiers and pronouns, of the sort something 
and that.
3.3.1.  The Substitution Problem
Philosophers, for the most part, take it for granted that the Relational Analysis is a 
direct match of the syntactic structure of attitude reports of the sort John thought 
that S. There is a well- known problem, though, with taking clausal complements 
of attitude verbs to act as referential terms standing for propositions. This is the 
Problem of Substitution; that is, the invalidity of an inference such as from (11a) 
to (11b):27
(11) a. John thought that Mary was happy.
b. ??? John thought the proposition that Mary was happy.
The present semantics of attitude reports avoids the Substitution Problem, 
since it does not treat clausal complements as referential terms, but rather as 
predicates of the attitudinal object associated with the implicit event argu-
ment of the verb. The clausal complement on that analysis does not serve to 
provide an argument of the relation expressed by the embedding verb, but 
serves to be predicated of an entity related to an implicit argument of the verb. 
In (11b), the proposition that Mary was happy could not enter the syntactic 
relation of clausal complementhood to the verb, but as a referential argument 
could only serve to provide an argument of the think- relation— but that is 
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impossible because think does not take objects with respect to its complement 
position.
This semantics also permits a straightforward account of clausal modifiers of 
nouns such as in John’s thought that Mary is happy. Here the that- clause will act as 
a predicate of the attitudinal object that is the (external) argument of thought, as in 
їd[thought(d, John) & [that Mary is happy](d)]. The standard view has to attribute 
to the that- clause either the status of an argument or an apposition, both of which 
have been shown to be syntactically implausible.28
3.3.2.  The Alternation Attitude Verb— Complex Attitudinal Predicate
There is also syntactic support for the semantic analysis of clausal complements of 
attitude verbs as predicates of attitudinal objects. Many languages display instead 
of simple attitude verbs complex- predicate constructions involving explicit refer-
ence to attitudinal objects. Complex- predicate constructions of this sort consist 
in a light verb (a verb almost devoid of lexical content), such as have, give, or 
make, and a nominal describing an attitudinal object. Thus, English displays the 
alternation think that S— have the thought that S, believe that S— have the belief 
that S, desire that S— have the desire that S, claim that S— make the claim that S, 
decide that S— make the decision that S, as well as order— give the order. In general, 
in the complex- predicate construction, the nominal is a nominal for a cogni-
tive product rather than a cognitive act. By involving explicit reference to the 
attitudinal object as part of its compositional semantics, the complex- predicate 
construction displays the present semantics of attitude reports, in a way, overtly, 
as in the logical form in (12b) for (12a):
(12) a. John has the thought [that Mary is happy].
b. ∃d(have(John, d) & thought(d) & [that Mary is happy](d))
Here the thought that Mary is happy stands for a kind of attitudinal object, an 
entity that shares truth conditions and other relevant properties with the particu-
lar thoughts that are its instances (as will be discussed in Section 4).
Sometimes a language has only the complex- predicate construction and lacks 
a simple attitude verb. Thus, English has have the impression, with no simple cor-
responding verb, and German has Angst haben ‘heave fear’, again lacking a cor-
responding simple verb.
There is also an alternation of modal verbs with complex predicates. In 
English, the verb need alternates with the complex predicate have a need, and a 
number of European languages have only the complex- predicate version, such as 
Italian (avere bisogno) and French (avoir besoin). Harves and Kayne (2012) argue 
that the English verb need is in fact the result of incorporating the copula have 
and the noun need. Kayne (2010) more generally pursues the view that all clausal 
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complement- taking verbs are derived from the complex- predicate construc-
tion, with the clausal complement being in fact a relative clause modifying the 
nominal.29
The alternation of simple attitude or modal verbs with complex predicates 
gives plausibility to the semantic analysis of attitude reports proposed in this 
paper, since that sort of analysis would be needed anyway for the semantics of the 
complex- predicate construction.
4.  Sharing of Contents and Kind of Attitudinal Objects
The main Fregean argument for propositions being mind- independent objects was 
the possibility of propositional contents being shared by different agents. If attitu-
dinal objects take the place of propositions as the truth- bearing objects associated 
with propositional attitudes and propositional contents are mere features of attitu-
dinal objects, the question will be how propositional contents can be shared. The 
notion of an attitudinal object allows for two answers, both of which are reflected 
in constructions of natural language.
First, the sharing of a propositional content may consist in two attitudinal 
objects being exactly similar (though not numerically identical), which is reported 
by the sentence below:
(13) a. John’s belief is the same as Mary’s.
(13) means that the content of John’s belief is just the same as that of Mary’s. Here 
the same as conveys, as usual, exact similarity among attitudinal objects, and as we 
have seen, attitudinal objects (of the same type) are exactly similar just in case they 
share the same content.
Second, the sharing of propositional contents may consist in kinds of attitudi-
nal objects being shared, as reported in this sentence:
(13) b. John and Mary share the belief that S.
Kinds of attitudinal objects naturally form the referents of terms like the thought 
that S, the claim that S, or the belief that S, allowing for typical kind predicate 
such as widespread or rare.30 Kinds of attitudinal objects are independent of a 
particular agent. But unlike propositions, they generally involve a particular 
force and a particular realization (illocutionary versus cognitive product, etc). 
29 Kayne (2010) does not explicitly say that complement clauses modify an underlying product 
noun; they may modify a silent noun such as fact instead. Kayne, though, would pursue that view that 
attitude verbs in general are derived from complex predicates consisting of a light verb and a product 
nominal (with the complement clause modifying the nominal).
30 Terms for kinds of attitudinal objects are semantically on a par with bare mass nouns and plu-
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Thus, the intention to leave the country is distinct from the hope to leave the 
country, and the claim that Mary is happy is distinct from the belief that Mary 
is happy.
Kinds of attitudinal objects share representational properties with their 
instances, again reflected in the applicability of truth- or satisfaction- related 
predicates:
(14) a. The belief that John won the race is true.
b. The expectation that John would become famous was not fulfilled.
Kinds of attitudinal objects may seem as problematic as abstract propositions with 
respect to their graspability and representational properties. However, the notion 
of a kind that is at stake is one that is strictly dependent on the particular attitudi-
nal object that makes up its instances, in several respects. First, kinds of attitudinal 
objects are formed on the basis of similarity relations among particular products. 
Thus, “the belief that S” has as its instances a maximal class of exactly similar belief 
products. Moreover, the properties of kinds of cognitive products are generally 
inherited from their instances (except for properties measuring the distribution 
of instances such as “being widespread”). “The belief that S” is true in virtue of all 
attitudinal objects of the form “d’s belief that S” being true, for some individual d. 
Kinds, of course, inherit not only representational properties from their instances, 
but also graspability.31
I will not go into a discussion of how kinds are to be conceived, whether as 
entities of their own or as mere pluralities of (possible) instances.32 What is impor-
tant in the present context is only that the instances of a kind of cognitive product 
are similar, based on a shared content and force, and that kinds of cognitive prod-
ucts have content- related properties (including truth or satisfaction conditions) in 
virtue of their instances having those properties.
5.  Attitudinal Objects and the Semantics of Special Quantifiers  
and Pronouns
Attitudinal objects and kinds of them play an important role in the semantics 
of quantifiers that standardly have been taken to stand for propositions, such as 
something, everything, the pronoun that, and relative clauses with what in contexts 
31 There is an issue as to whether the notion of a kind should permit non- instantiated kinds. There 
is an intuition that it should not, namely the understanding of “exist” with kinds. The hope that it would 
rain soon no longer exists at a time t just in case for no individual d, d’s hope that it would soon rain 
exists at t. However, for the purpose of reports about propositional contents that have not been enter-
tained, kinds with merely possible instances may have to be admitted.
32 For the (nonstandard) view that kinds in that sense are not single entities, but pluralities (as 
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in which they take the place of that- clauses33 Quantifiers or pronouns of this class 
appear in the place of clausal complements in the valid inferences below:
(15) a. John thinks that Mary is happy.
John thinks something.
b. John thinks what Mary thinks.
Mary thinks that it is raining.
John thinks that it is raining.
In previous work (Moltmann 2003a, 2003b, 2013a, chap. 4), I have argued that 
such quantifiers and pronouns are not ordinary quantifiers and pronouns but 
rather are nominalizing quantifiers, entities that nominalizations of the relevant 
verb would describe, namely attitudinal objects or kinds of them. In (15a, b), 
this will be the product nominalization of think, namely thought, as in John’s 
thought that S or in the thought that S. Given the present semantics of attitude 
reports, this means that (16a) has either the logical form in (16b) or the one in 
(16c):34
(16) a. John thinks something.
b. ∃e’∃e(think(e, John) & nice(e’) & e’ = prod(e))
c. ∃e’∃e(think(e, John) & nice(e’) & e’ = prod- kind(e))
In (16c), the function prod- kind maps an event e onto the kind of products exactly 
similar to the product of e. Reports of shared contents, such as the premise in 
(16b) can only involve product kinds, as below:
(17) ∃e∃e’∃e’’(think(e, John) & e’ = prod- kind(e) & think(e’’, Mary)  
& e’ = prod- kind(e’’))
The special pronoun that, when taking the place of clausal complements of atti-
tude verbs, will also stand for an attitudinal object or a kind of attitudinal object— 
the latter, for example, in the context below:
(18) John thought that it was raining. Mary thought that too.
There are two sorts of semantics evidence that special quantifiers and pronouns 
stand for attitudinal objects (Moltmann 2003a, 2003b). First, restrictions of special 
33 See, for example, Schiffer (1987, 2003).
34 In previous work (Moltmann 2003a, 2003b, 2013a), the Nominalization Theory of special 
quantifiers in the complement position of attitude verbs was linked to the neo- Russellian Multiple 
Relations Theory (see Appendix 2). But clearly the Nominalization Theory can be maintained indepen-
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quantifiers can generally be understood as predicates of attitudinal objects, not 
propositions. These are examples:
(19) a. John said something nice, namely that he wants to help.
b. John thought something daring.
What is said to be nice in (19a) is not the proposition that John wants to help, but 
rather the claim or remark that John wants to help— that is, the attitudinal object. 
Similarly, in (19b), what is said to be daring is not a proposition, but a thought.
Second, there are restrictions on the reporting of the sharing of the contents 
of different attitudes that indicate that it is kinds of attitudinal objects rather than 
pure propositions that are said to be shared. For example, (20a) and (21a) are 
hardly acceptable under ordinary circumstances as reports of the situations in 
(20b) and (21b):
(20) a. ??? John thought what Bill claimed, that Mary was ill.
b. John thought that Mary was ill and Bill claimed that Mary was ill.
(21) a. ??? John demanded what Bill claimed, that Mary should leave.
b. John demanded that Mary should leave, and Bill claimed that Mary 
should leave.
The reason is that a thought is not a claim and a demand is not an assertion. On 
the nominalization theory of special quantifiers, (20a) and (21a) will report the 
sharing of an attitudinal object, but there are no attitudinal objects that could be 
shared among the two attitudes that are described.
6.  Deontic Modals
The semantics of clausal complements of attitude verbs as predicates of attitudi-
nal objects carries over to modal sentences. In this paper I will focus on deontic 
modals because it is particularly intuitive that deontic modals involve the notion 
of an enduring modal product, the enduring product that may result from an illo-
cutionary or cognitive act.
Deontic modals bear an intimate connection to illocutionary and attitu-
dinal verbs describing directive products. For example, deontic modals may 
anaphorically relate to the illocutionary or cognitive product introduced by an 
illocutionary or attitudinal verb, as in the inferences from the a- sentences to the 
b- sentences below, which are valid (in (22a), provided John is in a suitable position 
of authority):
(22) a. John asked Bill to leave the room.
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(23) a. John promised to come.
b. John must come.
(22a) and (23a) involve illocutionary directive products, and (22b) and (23b) the 
associated enduring modal products, the obligations.
Deontic modals may also involve permissions as modal products, relating to 
a permissive illocutionary product, as below:
(24) a. John allowed Bill to leave.
b. Bill may leave.
In these examples, deontic modals involve modal products associated with the 
illocutionary product produced by a directive or permissive illocutionary act.35 
The modal products share the world- to- word/ mind direction of fit as well as their 
satisfiers with the illocutionary products. The modal products are not identical to 
the illocutionary products, though. For one thing, modal products may endure 
beyond the act that established them, unlike illocutionary products. The differ-
ence manifests itself in that in (22)– (24) the modal verbs are in the present tense, 
whereas the antecedent illocutionary or attitudinal verbs are in the past tense. 
Modal products share their satisfaction conditions with the illocutionary products 
with which they are associated, but they do not share the life span and the action- 
related aspects of the latter.
Closely related to the quasi- anaphoric use of modal verbs, as in (22)– (24), is a 
performative use of modal verbs. On the performative use, modals appear to serve 
the same purpose as the performative use of an illocutionary verb, given the right 
circumstances (and as such they pose a considerable challenge for the standard 
semantics of modals as quantifiers ranging over worlds). Thus the modals in (25b) 
and (26b) can have a performative use, just like the illocutionary verbs in (25a) 
and (26a), provided the speaker is in the right position of authority to establish an 
obligation or a permission:
(25) a. I hereby ask you to leave.
b. You must leave.
(26) a. I allow you to leave.
b. You may leave.
Whereas the performative uses of the sentences in (25a) and (26a) establish 
the products of the illocutionary acts that are explicitly being performed, the 
35 The modal verbs must and may do not come with a nominalization describing products, which 
may cast some doubt on the presence of modal products. This does not generally hold, though. Need, 
which is also a modal verb, does have a nominalization need. Moreover, the modal adjectives possible 
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performative uses of the modal sentences establish modal products, which would 
be associated with the relevant illocutionary products.
Deontic modals may also involve modal products of the sort of laws, rules, or 
conditions of various sorts that need not be associated with the directive products 
associated with illocutionary verbs.
In all cases, the modal itself underspecifies the nature of the product. Must 
and may, on the deontic reading, just specify that the modal product involves a 
world- to- word direction of fit with actions acting as satisfiers. The purpose of the 
complement or prejacent of the modal then is to characterize the satisfiers.
Turning now to the semantics of modal sentences, I will take the Davidsonian 
implicit arguments of deontic modals to be the modal products themselves, rather 
than events. In order to ensure a parallel with the semantics of attitude verbs, the 
product function prod will apply to the Davidsonian implicit argument of modals 
as well, simply mapping a modal product onto itself. The logical form of (27a), 
with the clausal- complement- taking modal verb need, will then be as in (27b):
(27) a. Bill needs to leave.
b. ∃d(need(d, Bill) & [Bill to leave](prod(d)))
(28a), with a deontic modal of permission, will be assigned the very same logical 
form as (27a), as in (28b):
(28) a. Bill is allowed to leave.
b. ∃d(is allowed to(d, Bill) & [Bill to leave](prod(d)))
Earlier, the semantic value of a sentence S was given as the property of objects to 
have as exact satisfiers truthmakers of S, as repeated below:
(7) [S]  = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → s ╠ S)]
This cannot be adequate, though, since then modals of necessity and modals 
of possibility would not be distinguished semantically. Given (7), (27a) would 
involve a modal object with the very same satisfaction conditions as (28a). But the 
permission for Bill to leave is not an obligation for Bill to leave. What distinguishes 
the permission from the obligation? Permissions allow certain actions, those they 
permit. Obligations allow for certain actions, those that comply with them, but 
they also exclude certain actions, those violating them. The permission for Bill 
to leave allows for actions of Bill leaving, but does not exclude any other actions. 
By contrast, the obligation for Bill to leave allows for actions of Bill’s leaving and 
excludes actions of Bill’s staying. That is, permissions have only satisfiers, whereas 
obligations have both satisfiers and violators. Also, illocutionary products can be 
distinguished in terms of having violators or not. An offer or an invitation has only 
satisfiers, but no violators; a request or an order has both satisfiers and violators.
The notion of violation as a relation between actions and modal or attitudinal 
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relation between a situation or action and a sentence. Fine uses the notion of exact 
falsemaking for the truthmaking conditions of negative sentences, as below:
(29) s ╟ not S iff s ╢ S.
That is, a situation s is an exact truthmaker of a sentence not S just in case s is 
entirely relevant for the falsehood of S. The relation ╢ corresponds to the notion 
of violation as a relation between sentences and modal or attitudinal objects. With 
this notion, the meaning of sentences can now be reformulated as below, where ╣ 
is the relation of (inexact) falsemaking:
(30) [S]  = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → s╠ S) & ∀s(s ╢ d → s ╣ S)]
That is, a sentence S expresses the property that holds of a modal or attitudinal 
object d just in case every exact satisfier of d is a (possibly inexact) truthmaker of 
S and every exact violator of d is a (possibly inexact) falsifier of S. In the case of 
permissions, of course, the second condition is vacuously fulfilled.
On this account, modals of necessity and modals of possibility lead to 
exactly the same logical form, but they involve different sorts of modal objects, 
with different satisfaction and violation conditions. This presents a very different 
approach to the semantics of modal sentences from the standard one based on 
quantification over possible worlds, and it sets out the challenge to account for 
the various logical relations among modal sentences that standard modal logic 
has dealt with, a challenge this paper will not aim to address, but that must await 
another occasion.
The semantics of sentences with a performative use of a modal will be parallel 
to the semantics of sentences with a performative use of an illocutionary verb. This 
first requires some remarks, though, about the semantics of independent sentences. 
Independent sentences can be assigned the very same property of attitudinal and 
modal objects specifying their satisfaction conditions in (30). With the literal use 
of a sentence S, the property S expresses is meant to characterize the illocution-
ary product the speaker intends to produce with his utterance (and thereby the 
performance of the relevant illocutionary act). The property given in (30) covers 
both declarative and imperative sentences, though the satisfaction relation relating 
satisfiers to assertions is different from that relating satisfiers to the illocutionary 
product associated with an imperative. Assertions involve a word- world direction 
of fit, whereas the illocutionary products associated with imperatives, requests, or 
permissions involve a world- word direction of fit.
Sentences with a performative use of an illocutionary verb, such as (25a) and 
(26a), will then express properties of illocutionary products, as indicated below:
(31) a. λd[∃e(ask(e, speaker) & d = prod(e) & [(addressee) leave](d))]
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That is, a performative use of an illocutionary verb leads to the sentence expressing 
a property of illocutionary products meant to characterize the product produced 
by uttering the sentence (and thereby performing an illocutionary act).
Similarly, sentences with a performative use of a modal, such as (25b) and 
(26b), will express properties of modal products, as below:
(32) a. λd[must(d) & [(addressee) leave](prod(d))]
b. λd[may(d) & [(addressee) leave](prod(d))]
That is, a performative use of modals leads to the sentence expressing a property 
of modal products meant to characterize the modal product produced by uttering 
the sentence (and thereby performing an illocutionary act).
If deontic modals are associated with modal objects, it is expected that other 
modals are as well. Thus, ability modals should be associated with modal objects 
that are abilities (and have manifestations of the ability as satisfiers), epistemic 
modals should have epistemic products of some sort as associated modal objects, 
etc. To develop the account for other modals in detail has to await a different 
occasion, though.36 The main purpose of this section was to show that treating 
sentences as predicates opens up a new perspective not only for the semantics 
of attitude reports, but also for modal sentences. In both cases, the complement 
clause (or the prejacent of a modal auxiliary) specifies the satisfiers and possibly 
violators of the associated modal or attitudinal object.
7.  Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined an account according to which sentences act 
semantically as predicates of attitudinal and modal objects. Attitudinal objects 
include the important category of cognitive products (besides) mental states. 
Cognitive products, I have argued, are to be understood in terms of the more 
general distinction between certain actions and the artifacts they may produce, 
on a par with laws and works of art and the acts that establish or create them. 
This means that accepting cognitive products as entities of their own, distinct 
from actions and abstract propositions, should go along with a more general 
recognition of (physically realized or abstract) artifacts as an ontological cat-
egory of their own, consisting of mind- dependent entities distinct from mental 
events and abstract objects. Cognitive products are as concrete as the corre-
sponding mental events or speech acts. The latter, however, are unsuitable for 
the roles that propositions were supposed to play, namely as truth- bearers and 
the bearers of the contents of attitudes. Being cognitive entities with essential 
truth or satisfaction conditions, cognitive products, and more generally attitu-
dinal objects, are able to play roles similar to that of propositions, but without 
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leading to the conceptual problems that arise when propositions are identified 
with formal abstract objects.
Cognitive products play the role of products rather than objects of mental 
acts such as thinking and judging. This is reflected in a different semantic analy-
sis of attitude reports than the standard Relational Analysis, namely an analysis 
on which clausal complements of attitude verbs do not provide arguments of a 
relation expressed by the attitude verb, but rather act as predicates of either the 
product of the event argument of the verb or of its mental state argument. An 
important feature of this account is its neutrality as to how cognitive or illocution-
ary products or mental states are to be conceived. Clausal complements of attitude 
verbs only give the satisfaction conditions of the relevant attitudinal objects; they 
do not have semantic values that, as such, act as the objects or contents of attitudes.
Appendix 1: A Distinction between Physical Actions and Physical Products?
If the distinction between the cognitive and illocutionary products and actions 
that set them up falls under the more general distinction between artifacts and the 
actions that create them, then the distinction should not extend to a distinction 
between physical actions and physical products. Twardowski’s (1912) own view, 
however, was that the action- product distinction includes the distinction between 
physical actions and their products, such as that between an action of walking and 
a walk, an act of jumping and a jump, and the act of screaming and the scream. 
Certainly, a walk cannot be considered an artifact produced by an act of walking. 
Similarly, a jump can hardly be considered an artifact resulting from a jumping. 
(An exception may be a jump performed at a competitive sports event, in which 
case the jump is meant to fulfill or set certain standards or be the object of certain 
standards of evaluation. This is not so for a jump as the byproduct of an act of 
escaping. The same holds for an explicitly intended scream as opposed to a scream 
that is the byproduct of an event of shock or agitation.) Linguistically, though, 
the same sorts of nominalizations are used for physical products as for cognitive 
and illocutionary products: jump, scream, and walk are morphologically on a par 
with belief, claim, and hope. This is what may have led Twardowski to embracing a 
physical action- product distinction.
Nominalizations like walk, jump, scream, belief, claim, and hope differ from 
gerunds in one common respect, and that is that they are count nouns rather 
than mass nouns. Count nouns typically apply to entities viewed as integrated 
wholes, whereas mass nouns apply to entities not viewed as integrated wholes 
(Moltmann 1997). The count character of walk, jump, and scream manifests 
itself in that such nouns describe events that may have “gestalt” properties 
and are viewed as wholes, which is not the case for gerunds. This difference is 
reflected in the way evaluative properties apply. If Mary’s dance was unusual, 
it may be so just because of the very beginning and the very end. But if Mary’s 
dancing was unusual, then unusualness pertains to Mary’s dancing through-
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naturally evaluates John’s scream as a whole, whereas when applying to “John’s 
screaming,” it evaluates an activity throughout the time it goes on. Cognitive 
and illocutionary products are generally described by means of count nouns 
(which means they are generally viewed as integrated wholes; for example, in 
view of the unity of their representational content), whereas the corresponding 
actions or states are described by means of mass nouns when using gerunds 
(though not when using action and state sortals, as in speech act or mental 
state). But the mass- count distinction is a more general distinction and may 
have given rise to the appearance of a distinction between physical actions and 
physical products.
Appendix 2: The Neo- Russelian Analysis of Attitude Reports and  
the Trope- Theoretic Analysis of Cognitive Products
In previous work (Moltmann 2013a, chap. 4), I had pursued a trope- based account 
of attitudinal objects within the neo- Russellian Multiple Relations Analysis of atti-
tude reports (Russell 1912, 1913, 1918). This account had treated cognitive and 
illocutionary product and mental states exactly alike ontologically, and it involved 
a very different semantics of attitude reports than the one on which clausal com-
plements are treated as predicates of the product of the event argument of the verb. 
This appendix will present some difficulties both for the neo- Russellian analysis 
and the trope- based account of attitudinal objects.
According to the neo- Russellian analysis, (1a) has the logical form in (1b):
(1) a. John thinks that Mary is happy.
b. THINK(John; [happy], Mary)
Here THINK is a multigrade predicate in its second position, taking the relevant 
propositional constituents as arguments in that position— that is, the property of 
being happy and Mary.37
Within the multigrade argument place, there will be different positions for 
different semantic roles, in particular one distinguished position for a property 
(or relation), meant to be predicated of the other arguments, as well as further 
argument positions matching the argument positions of the property (or relation). 
A given place in the multigrade position of an attitude verb may itself be mul-
tigrade. The structure of the multigrade position matches a structured proposi-
tion, on a standard conception of a structured proposition, though now viewed 
as an ordered plurality of propositional constituents (in the sense of a plurality as 
“many,” not as “one,” cf. Taylor and Hazen 1992).
37 For the notion of a multigrade predicate, see Oliver and Smiley (2004). Russell actually took 
attitude verbs to specify different relations in different syntactic contexts. Making use of multigrade 
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The Multiple Relations Analysis of attitude reports (though not as such 
intended by Russell himself) can be considered a formal match for the view that 
attitude verbs describe acts of cognitive predication, relating an agent to the prop-
ositional constituents so as to ensure a unified and truth- directed propositional 
content (Jubien 2001; Moltmann 2003b, 2013a, chap.  4; Soames 2010). On the 
analysis in (1b), the attitude verb describes an attitude- specific act of predication, 
such as predication in the thinking way, in the judging way, the claiming way, and 
so on. As on act- based views in general that take acts of predication to be con-
stitutive of propositional content, the predicational act should apply only to the 
meaning of the highest predicate or operator in the embedded sentence. And as on 
act- based views in general that take acts of predication to be constitutive of propo-
sitional content, this means that embedded sentences that are not of the simple 
subject- predicate sort pose a significant challenge. Thus, the belief- predicational 
act described by believes targets negation only in John believes that Mary did not 
win the race, and disjunction only in John believes that Mary won the race or Bill 
did, since neither sentence implies that John believes that Mary won the race. 
This raises the question, What are those operators or connectives predicated of? 
An obvious answer would be that they are predicated of attitudinal objects of the 
most general sort, such as “thoughts” or mere “entertainings.” However, this is not 
easy to reconcile with the apparent syntactic structure of the relevant sentences, 
and it leads to difficulties for attitudes attributed to animals and small children 
(Soames 2015).
Another problematic feature for the neo- Russellian analysis is a commitment 
to predicates standing for properties. Properties expressed by predicates, given the 
neo- Russellian analysis, will have to be given the status of objects, since they act 
as arguments of the multigrade attitudinal relation. Clearly, there are reasons to 
avoid such a commitment, which is in fact incompatible with the overall trope- 
nominalist ontology pursued in Moltmann (2013a).
The neo- Russellian analysis lends itself to a particular way of conceiving of 
the distinction between actions and their cognitive products, based on the notion 
of a trope, or the notion of a particularized property.38 On the trope- theoretic 
account in Moltmann (2013a, chap. 4), both actions and products are conceived 
of as tropes, but as complex tropes of different sorts. This account differs fun-
damentally from the one pursued in this paper, in that it considers the relation 
between actions and products not a causal relation between an action and the 
(abstract) artifact it produces, but rather one of “alternative constitution”. That 
is, on the trope- theoretic account, actions and products are based on the same 
goings- on in the world, but individuated differently so as to bear different sorts 
of properties.39
38 Williams (1953) is the classic modern reference on tropes.
39 The trope- theoretic account would also apply to the distinction between states as described by 
gerunds (believing, intending, desiring) and states as described by nominalizations of the sort belief, 
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One important characteristic of tropes is that they depend for their existence 
and identity on their bearer. Two tropes that have different bearers cannot be iden-
tical, but they can be similar if they instantiate the same property. Tropes that are 
instances of the same natural property are exactly similar (“the same”). The red-
ness of the tomato is “the same as” the redness of the apple if the very same shade 
of redness is instantiated in the tomato and in the apple. Besides monadic tropes, 
there are relational tropes, which are the particular manifestations of an n- place 
relation in n objects. A trope like “Socrates’ wisdom” is a first- level trope: it has 
as its bearer an individual. A second- level trope is, for example, “the greatness of 
Socrates’ wisdom,” which has as its bearer a (first- level) trope.
On the trope- theoretic account of the action- product distinction, both prod-
ucts such as “John’s thought that S” and actions such as “John’s thinking that S” 
are viewed as tropes, though as different kinds of complex tropes. Events (includ-
ing actions) are, on that account, instantiations of temporal transition relations 
among tropes, or relational tropes consisting in the instantiation in times of tem-
poral precedence relations among lower- level tropes. A very simple example is 
an event that consists in the transition from P(a) to Q(a) for some individual a 
and contrary properties P and Q. This event would be the instantiation in times 
t and t’ of the relation λt t’[Pt(a) & t < t’ & Qt’(a)]; that is, the relation that holds 
of times t and t’ if P holds of a at t and Q holds of a at t’ and t (immediately) pre-
cedes t’. Temporal transitions conceived as tropes in this way seem to have just the 
sorts of properties that events have. For example, for two transitions to be exactly 
similar, the properties and individuals involved need to be the same, but the times 
(the bearers of the tropes) do not. Moreover, since a trope ontologically depends 
on its bearer, the time of occurrence will be essential to an event conceived as a 
transition.
Attitudinal objects on the trope- theoretic account are instances of attitudinal 
or illocutionary multigrade relations, but in the sense of quasi- relational tropes. 
Quasi- relational tropes are monadic tropes instantiating object- dependent 
properties based on relations. Whereas “the relation between John and Bill” is a 
relational trope, “John’s relatedness to Bill” is a quasi- relational trope. As quasi- 
relational tropes, attitudinal objects were considered instantiations in an agent of 
complex properties of the sort λx[think(x; [happy], Mary)]. The attitudinal object 
John’s thought that Mary is happy will then take the form f(John, λx[claim(x; C1, 
…, Cn)]), where f is the function mapping an agent and a property to the instan-
tiation of the property in the agent at the relevant time. Conceiving of attitudinal 
objects as quasi- relational tropes appears to explain their distinctive characteris-
tics. Being quasi- relational tropes, two attitudinal objects are exactly similar or 
“the same” just in case they involve the same attitudinal mode and the same prop-
ositional constituents. They may differ in the agents involved (the bearers of the 
quasi- relational tropes). As instances of cognitive predication relations, attitudi-
nal objects will be truth- (or satisfaction- )directed (since this is what predication 
aims for). Finally, the time of occurrence may be only accidental to an attitudinal 
object. An attitudinal object as the instantiation of an attitudinal property need 
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events, by contrast, times are the bearers of the transition tropes themselves and 
thus essential.40
The trope- theoretic account, even though it appears to explain the properties 
that distinguish actions and their cognitive products, faces a range of difficulties.
First, by considering events to be features of times and attitudinal objects to 
be features of agents, the account carries a rather counterintuitive element, partic-
ularly with respect to the spatial location of events and attitudinal objects. Events 
are generally spatially located, but it is not clear how that can be so if events are 
features of times. The spatial location of thoughts and beliefs is less obvious, but 
clearly screams can hardly be viewed as features of agents, sharing their location. 
Also, the notion of a quasi- relational trope is not easy to make sense of; in fact, 
even the notion of a relational trope is a controversial one.41
A second issue for the trope- theoretic account is its lack of generality if cog-
nitive and illocutionary products are considered ontologically on a par with arti-
facts in general. Materially realized artifacts certainly cannot be viewed as features 
of agents. Cognitive products, recall, may themselves have a material realization 
(such as the physical products of illocutionary acts of writing). This also holds for 
auditory psychophysical products such as a shout, a claim, or a whisper. The trope- 
theoretic account of attitudinal objects appears inapplicable to physically realized 
cognitive products.
Another serious problem for the trope- theoretic account is that it takes all 
attitudinal objects to be directly constituted by acts of predication. This raises dif-
ficulties for sentences that are not of the subject- predicate sort, and for implicit 
attitudes and mental states. There is no flexibility in the trope- theoretic account to 
accommodate these.
The account pursued in this paper contrasts with the trope- theoretic account, 
in that it is designed toward the generality of the action- product distinction. It 
does not require all products to be constituted by acts of predication and propo-
sitional constituents. In particular, the semantics is neutral as to how particular 
types of cognitive, illocutionary, and modal products are to be conceived ontologi-
cally. Sentences just serve to characterize them in terms of their truthmakers or 
satisfiers. It leaves the nature of cognitive products a matter for the philosophy of 
mind rather than making it a concern for semantic theory.
That said, the semantics ultimately will have to be complemented by a formal 
ontological theory of abstract and physically realized artifacts that will account for 
their distinctive characteristics.
40 This account also appears to shed light on why products, but not actions, are treated as wholes 
(see Appendix 1). There is no problem for an agent (of a product) to instantiate a time- related property 
involving an interval as a whole, but properties involving the interval as a whole can hardly play a role 
in instances of temporal transition properties in subsequent times.
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Fujimoto, 57– 84. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
Moulton, Keir. 2009. Natural Selection and the Syntax of Clausal Complementation. PhD 
diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Oliver, Alex, and Timothy Smiley 2004. “Multigrade Predicates.” Mind 113 (452): 609– 81.
Prior, A. N. 1971. Objects of Thought. Edited by P. T. Geach and A.  J. P. Kenny. Oxford: 
Clarendon.
Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, London:  Williams and Norgate; 
New York: Henry Holt.
— — — . 1913. Theory of Knowledge. Edited by E. Ramsden Eames. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Reprint, London: Routledge, 1993.
— — — . 1918. “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.” Monist 28: 495– 527; 29: 32– 63, 190– 
222, 345– 380. Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, edited by Robert Charles Marsh 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 177– 281.
Schiffer, Stephen R. 1987. Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
— — — . 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.









Cognitive Products and Semantics 289
— — — . 2015. Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press.
Taylor, Barry, and Allen P. Hazen 1992. “Flexibly Structured Predication.” Logique et Analyse 
35: 375– 93.
Thomasson, Amie L. 1999. Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— — — .2004. “The Ontology of Art.” In The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, edited by Peter 
Kivy, 78– 92. Oxford: Blackwell.
— — — . 2005. “Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects.” In Existence, Culture, 
Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, 115– 36. 
Frankfurt: Ontos.
Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1909. “On the Psychology of Thinking.” English translation pub-
lished in this volume.
— — — . 1911. “Actions and Products:  Some Remarks on the Borderline of Psychology, 
Grammar, and Logic.” Reprinted in On Actions, Products, and Other Topics in Philosophy, 
edited by Johannes Brandl and Jan Wolenski (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999), 
103– 32. Also reproduced in this volume.
Ulrich, William. 1976. “An Alleged Ambiguity in the Nominalizations of Illocutionary 
Verbs.” Philosophica 18: 113– 27.
van der Schaar, Maria. 2006. “On the Ambiguities of the Term Judgment: An Evaluation 
of Twardowski’s Distinction between Action and Product.” In Actions, Products and 
Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy Philosophy, edited by Arkadiusz Scrudzimski 
and Dariusz Lukasiewicz, 35– 53. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Williams, D. C. 1953. “On the Elements of Being." Review of Metaphysics 7: 3– 18.
